

otherwise be the case if the weight limit were 100,000 pounds for all of Maine's interstate highways.

The problem Maine faces due to the disparity in truck weight limits affects many communities and is clearly evident in the eastern Maine cities of Bangor and Brewer. In this region, a 2-mile stretch of Interstate 395 connects two major State highways that carry significant truck traffic across Maine. I-395 affords direct and safe access between these major corridors, but because of the existing Federal truck weight limit, many heavy trucks are prohibited from using this multi-lane, limited access highway.

Instead, these trucks, which sometimes carry hazardous materials, are required to maneuver through the downtown portions of Bangor and Brewer on two-lane roadways. Truckers are faced with two options; the first is a 3.5-mile diversion through downtown Bangor that requires several very difficult and dangerous turns. The second route is a 7.5-mile diversion that includes 20 traffic lights and requires travel through portions of downtown Bangor, as well. Congestion is a significant issue and safety is seriously compromised as a result of these required diversions.

A recent study, conducted by the Maine Department of Transportation, found that the accident rate between 2000 and 2003—per 100 million vehicle miles traveled—was more than four times higher on two-lane roads than on the Maine Turnpike, which had four lanes at the time of the study. A uniform truck weight limit of 100,000 pounds on Maine's interstate highways would reduce highway miles, as well as the travel times necessary to transport freight through Maine, resulting in safety, economic, and environmental benefits.

Moreover, Maine's extensive network and local roads would be better preserved without the wear and tear of heavy truck traffic. Most important, however, a uniform truck weight limit will keep trucks on the interstate where they belong, rather than on roads and highways that pass through Maine's cities, towns, and neighborhoods.

The legislation that Senator SNOWE and I are introducing addresses the safety issues we face in Maine because of the disparities in truck weight limits. The legislation directs the Secretary of Transportation to establish a commercial truck safety pilot program in Maine. Under the pilot program, the truck weight limit on all Maine highways that are part of the Interstate Highway System would be set at 100,000 pounds for 3 years. During the waiver period, the Secretary would study the impact of the pilot program on safety and would receive the input of a panel on which State officials, and representatives from safety organizations, municipalities, and the commercial trucking industry would serve. The waiver would become permanent if the panel

determined that motorists were safer as a result of a uniform truck weight limit on Maine's interstate highway system.

Maine's citizens and motorists are needlessly at risk because too many heavy trucks are forced off the interstate and onto local roads. The legislation Senator SNOWE and I are introducing is a commonsense approach to a significant safety problem in my State. I hope my colleagues will support passage of this important legislation.

By Mr. ALEXANDER (for himself, Mr. KYL, and Mr. CORNYN):
S. 489. A bill to amend chapter 111 of title 28, United States Code, to limit the duration of Federal consent decrees to which State and local governments are a party, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Mr. ALEXANDER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

S. 489

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Federal Consent Decree Fairness Act".

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress finds that:

(1) Consent decrees are for remedying violations of rights, and they should not be used to advance any policy extraneous to the protection of those rights.

(2) Consent decrees are also for protecting the party who faces injury and should not be expanded to apply to parties not involved in the litigation.

(3) In structuring consent decrees, courts should take into account the interests of State and local governments in managing their own affairs.

(4) Consent decrees should be structured to give due deference to the policy judgments of State and local officials as to how to obey the law.

(5) Whenever possible, courts should not impose consent decrees that require technically complex and evolving policy choices, especially in the absence of judicially discoverable and manageable standards.

(6) Consent decrees should not be unlimited, but should contain an explicit and realistic strategy for ending court supervision.

SEC. 3. LIMITATION ON CONSENT DECREES.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Chapter 111 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

"§ 1660. Consent decrees

"(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

"(1) The term 'consent decree'—

"(A) means any final order imposing injunctive relief against a State or local government or a State or local official sued in their official capacity entered by a court of the United States that is based in whole or part upon the consent or acquiescence of the parties;

"(B) does not include private settlements; and

"(C) does not include any final order entered by a court of the United States to implement a plan to end segregation of students or faculty on the basis of race, color, or national origin in elementary schools, secondary schools, or institutions of higher education.

"(2) The term 'special master' means any person, regardless of title or description given by the court, who is appointed by a court of the United States under rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 48 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, or similar Federal law.

"(b) LIMITATION ON DURATION.—

"(1) IN GENERAL.—A State or local government or a State or local official, or their successor, sued in their official capacity may file a motion under this section with the court that entered a consent decree to modify or vacate the consent decree upon the earlier of—

"(A) 4 years after a consent decree is originally entered by a court of the United States, regardless if the consent decree has been modified or reentered during that period; or

"(B) in the case of a civil action in which—

"(i) a State is a party (including an action in which a local government is also a party), the expiration of the term of office of the highest elected State official who authorized the consent of the State in the consent decree; or

"(ii) a local government is a party and the State encompassing the local government is not a party, the expiration of the term of office of the highest elected local government official who authorized the consent of the local government to the consent decree.

"(2) BURDEN OF PROOF.—With respect to any motion filed under paragraph (1), the burden of proof shall be on the party who originally filed the civil action to demonstrate that the continued enforcement of a consent decree is necessary to uphold a Federal right.

"(3) RULING ON MOTION.—Not later than 90 days after the filing of a motion under this subsection, the court shall rule on the motion.

"(4) EFFECT PENDING RULING.—If the court has not ruled on the motion to modify or vacate the consent decree during the 90-day period described under paragraph (3), the consent decree shall have no force or effect for the period beginning on the date following that 90-day period through the date on which the court enters a ruling on the motion.

"(c) SPECIAL MASTERS.—

"(1) COMPENSATION.—The compensation to be allowed to a special master overseeing any consent decree under this section shall be based on an hourly rate not greater than the hourly rate established under section 3006A of title 18, for payment of court-appointed counsel, plus costs reasonably incurred by the special master.

"(2) TERMINATION.—In no event shall the appointment of a special master extend beyond the termination of the relief granted in the consent decree."

(b) TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—The table of sections for chapter 111 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

"§ 1660. Consent decrees."

SEC. 4. EFFECTIVE DATE.

The amendments made by this Act shall take effect on the date of enactment of this Act and apply to all consent decrees regardless of—

(1) the date on which the final order of a consent decree is entered; or

(2) whether any relief has been obtained under a consent decree before the date of enactment of this Act.

AMENDMENTS SUBMITTED AND PROPOSED

SA 15. Mr. AKAKA (for himself, Mr. DURBIN, Mr. LEAHY, and Mr. SARBANES) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 256, to amend

title 11 of the United States Code, and for other purposes.

SA 16. Mr. DURBIN (for himself, Ms. STABENOW, Mr. BAYH, Ms. LANDRIEU, Mr. LEAHY, Mr. LEVIN, Mr. SCHUMER, Ms. CANTWELL, Mr. NELSON, of Florida, Mr. KENNEDY, Mr. KERRY, Mrs. CLINTON, and Ms. MIKULSKI) proposed an amendment to the bill S. 256, *supra*.

SA 17. Mr. FEINGOLD proposed an amendment to the bill S. 256, *supra*.

SA 18. Mrs. FEINSTEIN submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by her to the bill S. 256, *supra*; which was ordered to lie on the table.

SA 19. Mrs. FEINSTEIN (for herself and Mr. KYL) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by her to the bill S. 256, *supra*; which was ordered to lie on the table.

SA 20. Mr. SCHUMER submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 256, *supra*; which was ordered to lie on the table.

SA 21. Mr. SCHUMER submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 256, *supra*; which was ordered to lie on the table.

SA 22. Mr. SCHUMER submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 256, *supra*; which was ordered to lie on the table.

SA 23. Mr. SESSIONS proposed an amendment to the bill S. 256, *supra*.

SA 24. Mr. ROCKEFELLER (for himself and Mr. LEAHY) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 256, *supra*; which was ordered to lie on the table.

SA 25. Mr. ROCKEFELLER submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 256, *supra*; which was ordered to lie on the table.

SA 26. Mr. LEAHY (for himself, Ms. SNOWE, and Ms. CANTWELL) proposed an amendment to the bill S. 256, *supra*.

SA 27. Mr. CHAFEE (for himself and Mr. REED) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 256, *supra*; which was ordered to lie on the table.

TEXT OF AMENDMENTS

SA 15. Mr. AKAKA (for himself, Mr. DURBIN, Mr. LEAHY, and Mr. SARBANES) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 256, to amend title 11 of the United States Code, and for other purposes; as follows:

On page 473, strike beginning with line 12 through page 482, line 24, and insert the following:

SEC. 1301. ENHANCED CONSUMER DISCLOSURES REGARDING MINIMUM PAYMENTS.

(a) DISCLOSURES REGARDING OUTSTANDING BALANCES.—Section 127(b) of the Truth in Lending Act (15 U.S.C. 1637(b)) is amended by adding at the end the following:

“(11)(A) Information regarding repayment of the outstanding balance of the consumer under the account, appearing in conspicuous type on the front of the first page of each such billing statement, and accompanied by an appropriate explanation, containing—

“(i) the words ‘Minimum Payment Warning: Making only the minimum payment will increase the amount of interest that you pay and the time it will take to repay your outstanding balance.’;

“(ii) the number of years and months (rounded to the nearest month) that it would take for the consumer to pay the entire amount of that balance, if the consumer pays only the required minimum monthly payments;

“(iii) the total cost to the consumer, shown as the sum of all principal and inter-

est payments, and a breakdown of the total costs in interest and principal, of paying that balance in full if the consumer pays only the required minimum monthly payments, and if no further advances are made;

“(iv) the monthly payment amount that would be required for the consumer to eliminate the outstanding balance in 36 months if no further advances are made; and

“(v) a toll-free telephone number at which the consumer may receive information about accessing credit counseling and debt management services.

“(B)(i) Subject to clause (ii), in making the disclosures under subparagraph (A) the creditor shall apply the interest rate in effect on the date on which the disclosure is made.

“(ii) If the interest rate in effect on the date on which the disclosure is made is a temporary rate that will change under a contractual provision specifying a subsequent interest rate or applying an index or formula for subsequent interest rate adjustment, the creditor shall apply the interest rate in effect on the date on which the disclosure is made for as long as that interest rate will apply under that contractual provision, and then shall apply the adjusted interest rate, as specified in the contract. If the contract applies a formula that uses an index that varies over time, the value of such index on the date on which the disclosure is made shall be used in the application of the formula.”.

(b) ACCESS TO CREDIT COUNSELING AND DEBT MANAGEMENT INFORMATION.—

(1) GUIDELINES REQUIRED.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Trade Commission (in this section referred to as the “Board” and the “Commission”, respectively) shall jointly, by rule, regulation, or order, issue guidelines for the establishment and maintenance by creditors of a toll-free telephone number for purposes of the disclosures required under section 127(b)(11) of the Truth in Lending Act, as added by this Act.

(B) APPROVED AGENCIES.—Guidelines issued under this subsection shall ensure that referrals provided by the toll-free number include only those agencies approved by the Board and the Commission as meeting the criteria under this section.

(2) CRITERIA.—The Board and the Commission shall only approve a nonprofit budget and credit counseling agency for purposes of this section that—

(A) demonstrates that it will provide qualified counselors, maintain adequate provision for safekeeping and payment of client funds, provide adequate counseling with respect to client credit problems, and deal responsibly and effectively with other matters relating to the quality, effectiveness, and financial security of the services it provides;

(B) at a minimum—

(i) is registered as a nonprofit entity under section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986;

(ii) has a board of directors, the majority of the members of which—

(I) are not employed by such agency; and

(II) will not directly or indirectly benefit financially from the outcome of the counseling services provided by such agency;

(iii) if a fee is charged for counseling services, charges a reasonable and fair fee, and provides services without regard to ability to pay the fee;

(iv) provides for safekeeping and payment of client funds, including an annual audit of the trust accounts and appropriate employee bonding;

(v) provides full disclosures to clients, including funding sources, counselor qualifications, possible impact on credit reports, any

costs of such program that will be paid by the client, and how such costs will be paid;

(vi) provides adequate counseling with respect to the credit problems of the client, including an analysis of the current financial condition of the client, factors that caused such financial condition, and how such client can develop a plan to respond to the problems without incurring negative amortization of debt;

(vii) provides trained counselors who—

(I) receive no commissions or bonuses based on the outcome of the counseling services provided;

(II) have adequate experience; and

(III) have been adequately trained to provide counseling services to individuals in financial difficulty, including the matters described in subparagraph (F);

(viii) demonstrates adequate experience and background in providing credit counseling;

(ix) has adequate financial resources to provide continuing support services for budgeting plans over the life of any repayment plan; and

(x) is accredited by an independent, nationally recognized accrediting organization.

SA 16. Mr. DURBIN (for himself, Ms. STABENOW, Mr. BAYH, Ms. LANDRIEU, Mr. LEAHY, Mr. LEVIN, Mr. SCHUMER, Ms. CANTWELL, Mr. NELSON of Florida, Mr. KENNEDY, Mr. KERRY, Mrs. CLINTON, and Ms. MIKULSKI) proposed an amendment to the bill S. 256, to amend title 11 of the United States Code, and for other purposes; as follows:

On page 13, between lines 13 and 14, insert the following:

“(D) Subparagraphs (A) through (C) shall not apply, and the court may not dismiss or convert a case based on any form of means testing, if—

“(i) the debtor or the debtor’s spouse is a servicemember (as defined in section 101 of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (50 App. U.S.C. 511(1)));

“(ii) the debtor or the debtor’s spouse is a veteran (as defined in section 101(2) of title 38, United States Code); or

“(iii) the debtor’s spouse dies while in military service (as defined in section 101(2) of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (50 App. U.S.C. 511(2))).

On page 67, between lines 18 and 19, insert the following:

SEC. 206. DISALLOWANCE OF CLAIMS FILED ON HIGH-COST PAYDAY LOANS MADE TO SERVICEMEMBERS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 502(b) of title 11, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in paragraph (8), by striking “or” at the end;

(2) in paragraph (9), by striking the period at the end; and

(3) by adding at the end the following:

“(10) such claim results from an assignment (including a loan or an agreement to deposit military pay into a joint account from which another person may make withdrawals, except when the assignment is for the benefit of a spouse or dependent of the debtor) of the debtor’s right to receive—

“(A) military pay made in violation of section 701(c) of title 37; or

“(B) military pension or disability benefits made in violation of section 5301(a) of title 38; or

“(11) such claim is based on a debt of a servicemember or a dependent of a servicemember that—

“(A) is secured by, or conditioned upon—

“(i) a personal check held for future deposit; or

“(ii) electronic access to a bank account; or